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DECODING STUDENT SPEECH 
RIGHTS: CLARIFICATION AND 
APPLICATION OF SUPREME COURT 
PRINCIPLES TO ONLINE STUDENT 
SPEECH CASES 
COURTNEY M. WILLARD* ** 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine, as an adolescent, having the opportunity to broadcast 
every mindless or offensive thought that blew through your brain to a 
vast audience of your peers and complete strangers.  Would you have 
used discretion?  MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr,1 and 
independent blogs have made it possible for adolescents to have a 
widespread audience for their unfiltered speech.2  The accessibility of the 
  * Editor’s Note: Last year, the Golden Gate community was deeply saddened by 
Courtney’s unexpected and untimely death.  It is my humble privilege to publish her work here, 
posthumously.  This piece is presented largely in its original form, having been minimally edited.  
We owe our deepest gratitude to Courtney’s mother, Aundrea Turner, and her father, Jonathan 
Willard, for extending us the opportunity to publish this piece in Courtney’s memory.  We are ever-
grateful for Professor Eric Christiansen’s support and guidance on this Comment.  Additionally, I 
must thank the Law Review Editorial Board, particularly Kyle Mabe and Jessica Rosen, for their 
unwavering dedication to this process. 
  ** Courtney M. Willard, Nov. 4, 1987–Apr. 18, 2012.  Certificate of Attendance, Golden 
Gate University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Political Science, Michigan State University, 2009. 
 1 See www.myspace.com; www.facebook.com; www.twitter.com; tumblr.com. 
 2 See, Renee L. Servance, Comment, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict 
Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1235 (2003) (arguing that the 
Internet is not only “ever-present but one can also quickly and easily disseminate its content to an 
infinite number of people”). 
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Internet has grown exponentially, even within the last decade, creating an 
ever-increasing platform for speech.3 
The most likely topics of angst among students relate to their 
school: teachers, friends, and extracurricular activities.  Students flock to 
various social media websites to share their feelings about, among other 
things, these familiar topics.4  Instantly, their thoughts are transmitted to 
their peers and whoever else may have access to the content.  The 
opportunity to unleash personal sentiments into the blogosphere has 
undoubtedly helped multitudes of young people feel connected to their 
peers in unprecedented ways.  It is the content of this unbridled speech, 
however, that has many troubled—especially school officials.5  It has 
also given rise to several significant legal issues. 
When may a school restrict student speech?  What are the 
constitutional boundaries of a school’s authority over student speech?  
When a student chooses the Internet as a sounding board for his 
offensive and possibly vulgar opinions of a teacher or fellow student, 
should the school have the authority to discipline the speech?  If so, what 
types of school-targeted speech would warrant such disciplinary action? 
The balance between a student’s First Amendment right to freedom 
of expression and a school’s responsibility to provide a safe environment 
for both students and staff has proved to be a difficult one to maintain.6  
The United States Supreme Court first set a standard to analyze the 
constitutional limits of student speech in the 1960s with the landmark 
decision of Tinker v. Des Moines School District.7  Since then, the 
evolving modes of student speech have forced the Supreme Court to 
repeatedly reconsider the issue.8  The result has been a myriad of 
 3 Erin Reeves, Note, The “Scope of a Student”: How To Analyze Student Speech in the Age 
of the Internet, 42 GA. L. REV. 1127, 1128-29 (2008) (“Since its modest beginnings, the Internet has 
become an enormous presence in everyday life, with North America alone experiencing a usage 
growth of 120% just in the years 2000-2007.”). 
 4 Pew Research Ctr., Trend Data (Teens), PEW INTERNET, www.pewinternet.org/Static-
Pages/Trend-Data-(Teens)/Online-Activites-Total.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (As of July 2011, 
80% of teen Internet users use an online social networking site like MySpace and Facebook). 
 5 See Reeves, supra note 3, at 1129 (“One area where Internet usage has been especially 
contentious is in the educational realm as administrators, teachers, students, and increasingly courts 
are attempting to determine how student activity on the Internet fits within current precedent 
regarding appropriate behavior of students, both on- and off-campus.”). 
 6 See id. at 1141-42 (“[D]ue to both the evolution of technology and students’ willingness to 
test the boundaries of their First Amendment rights in schools, this precedent has proven to be 
murky, not easily applicable to the variety of cases that have arisen, and potentially outdated and 
wholly inadequate to address the new student speech issues facing courts today.”). 
 7 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 8 See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
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decisions that chip away at the Tinker decision by creating narrow 
exceptions for certain circumstances of student speech.9 
Instead of students peacefully donning black armbands in protest of 
the Vietnam War,10 modern courts are faced with increasingly offensive 
student speech in the unrestricted realm of the Internet.  Supreme Court 
decisions have not established a sufficient method for lower courts to 
uniformly analyze the modern limits of Internet student speech.11  
Without a clear standard, lower courts are obligated to force the facts of 
modern cases into narrowly defined exceptions, or otherwise simply 
assume the Tinker standard applies to situations previously unforeseen 
by the earlier Court.  Uncertainty has caused courts to flounder and hand 
down conflicting decisions supported by incomplete precedent.12 
This Comment identifies the underlying principles of Supreme 
Court precedent governing student speech rights and applies those 
principles, as appropriate, to analyze online student speech.  Part I 
provides a background of the four Supreme Court cases governing 
student speech.  Four factors are identified from the Supreme Court 
decisions that continue to guide the analysis of student speech rights: 
sponsorship, location, effect, and content.  Part II explores lower courts’ 
confusion in applying the four factors to online student speech cases. 
Finally, Part III examines the factors applicable to online student 
speech and provides guidance for future courts to analyze online student 
speech rights.  As the predominant Supreme Court precedent, the Tinker 
standard should be used to analyze online student speech cases because it 
correctly addresses the effect of a student’s speech felt within the school.  
Further, three categories are presented that should guide courts’ 
assessment of the content of online student speech: outrageous or 
inherently offensive speech; speech that is focused or targeted toward the 
 9 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (holding that a student’s free speech rights were not violated based 
on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school assembly); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 
273 (holding that school officials could reserve the right to reasonably restrict certain portions of a 
high school newspaper published by students in class); Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (holding that school 
officials may “restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as 
promoting illegal drug use”). 
 10 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 11 Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Note, Uncertainty at the “Outer Boundaries” of the First 
Amendment: Extending the Arm of School Authority Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into CyberSpace, 
24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 731, 746 (2010) (“Courts have applied the Tinker, Fraser, 
Kuhlmeier and, now, Morse standards in varying ways to decide Internet student speech cases.  
Moreover, some courts have found that school officials lack disciplinary authority over student 
Internet expression altogether because of the expression’s off-campus nature.” (footnote omitted)). 
 12 Stephanie Klupinski, Note, Getting Past the Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student Speech 
in the Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 625 (2010) (“With no clear understanding of when and how 
to evaluate Internet speech, the courts, as a result, have used an inconsistent application of standards 
and tests to the cases before them.”). 
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school, students, or faculty; and general school-related speech.  Lower 
courts need a standard to analyze student speech, but until the Supreme 
Court specifically rules on online student speech, the principles set forth 
in previous rulings must be consistently applied. 
I.  THE CURRENT STATE OF STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS 
Since the Supreme Court first ruled on students’ free speech rights 
in 1969, the Court has revisited the area three times.13  Each 
supplementary decision carved out an exception14 to the original rule 
allowing restriction of student expression when the speech created a 
“material and substantial disruption” to the school.15  The four Supreme 
Court decisions identified four general factors that govern student speech 
rights: a school’s possible sponsorship of the speech, the location of the 
student’s speech, the effect of the speech felt within the school, and the 
content of the speech.16  Lower courts, having no other guidance, have 
inconsistently applied these factors to online student speech cases 
resulting in a “state of tumult about the precise scope of First 
Amendment rights possessed by students.”17 
A.  SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT OF STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS 
1.  The Two-Prong Tinker Standard 
Set against the backdrop of civil unrest during the 1960s, it was the 
decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District that 
declared, “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed 
 
 13 See generally Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260; Morse, 551 U.S. at 
393. 
 14 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (holding that a student’s free speech rights were not violated based 
on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school assembly); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 
273 (holding that school officials could reserve the right to reasonably restrict certain portions of a 
high school newspaper published by students in class); Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (holding that school 
officials may “restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as 
promoting illegal drug use”). 
 15 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 16 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (holding that a student’s free speech rights were not violated based 
on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school assembly); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 
273 (holding that school officials could reserve the right to reasonably restrict certain portions of a 
high school newspaper published by students in class); Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (holding that school 
officials may “restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as 
promoting illegal drug use”). 
 17 Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free 
Expression Take Hold in Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1139 (2003). 
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their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”18  A group of adults and students within one school 
district chose to object to the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands 
to their respective schools.19  As an attempt to preempt the political 
protest, the principals of the school district adopted a policy to punish 
any student who refused to remove his armband and suspend the student 
until he returned without the armband.20  Three Tinker siblings were 
suspended when they chose to wear the armbands, and subsequently filed 
suit challenging the school’s right to punish them for exercising their 
First Amendment right to free speech.21 
The Court addressed the tension created when students’ First 
Amendment free speech rights intersect with the duties and rules of 
school authorities.22  Extracting language from the Fifth Circuit, the 
Court focused on whether the armbands “‘materially and substantially 
interfer[ed] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school’ [or] collid[ed] with the rights of others.”23  The 
facts showed that the armbands did provoke some hostile remarks and a 
dispute during class involving a protestor.24  However, finding “no 
indication that the work of the schools or any class was disrupted,” the 
majority found the school’s disciplinary actions violated the students’ 
First Amendment rights.25 
Rejecting the lower court’s ruling that the suspensions were based 
on a reasonable fear of disturbance, the Supreme Court confirmed the 
principle that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” will 
not overcome students’ First Amendment right to freedom of 
expression.26  The standard of material and substantial interference 
works to ensure school officials will not act under a “mere desire to 
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint.”27  The Tinker students were suspended because of 
a motivation to avoid the potential controversy regarding the Vietnam 
War protest, not disruption within the schoo 28
 18 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 19 Id. at 504. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id.; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. 
Iowa 1966), aff’d, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 22 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. 
 23 Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 24 Id. at 517. 
 25 Id. at 508. 
 26 Id. at 509; see also Tinker, 258 F. Supp. 971. 
 27 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 28 Id. at 510. 
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The Court also refused to restrict freedom of expression to 
classroom hours.29  A student—in or out of class—whose actions 
produce a material disruption in classwork, create substantial disorder, or 
invade the rights of others, will not be protected from punishment.30  
This standard has created a variety of conflicting decisions in the lower 
courts when attempting to apply the Tinker standard to online student 
speech cases.31 
2.  Lewd and Obscene Student Speech 
Recognizing a need to address specific types of student speech, 
Bethel School District v. Fraser created a standard to apply to a student’s 
use of lewd and obscene speech while on school campus.32  During a 
mandatory high school assembly, Matthew Fraser delivered a speech 
containing an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor” to the 
response of hooting, yelling, and sexually graphic gestures.33  School 
officials suspended Fraser, referencing the Tinker standard and 
pronouncing his speech as “indecent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty 
and decency” of the audience.34 
The Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent a school 
district from disciplining Fraser, but rather that the suspension was 
“perfectly appropriate,”35 given that the conduct was “wholly 
inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”36  
It is this standard, not Tinker’s “material and substantial interference” 
language, that the Court employed in deciding school officials did not 
violate Fraser’s First Amendment rights.37  The only Tinker analysis 
comes as a brief investigation on the possible embarrassment to teenaged 
school students, and the otherwise immature audience of 14-year-old 
teenagers.38 
Confusing the newly founded standard, the Court alluded to other 
factors supporting its decision. The Court distinguished Fraser from 
 29 Id. at 512. 
 30 Id. at 513. 
 31 See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625 (“With no clear understanding of when and how to 
evaluate Internet speech, the [lower] courts, as a result, have used an inconsistent application of 
standards and tests to the cases before them.”). 
 32 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680, 684-86 (1986). 
 33 Id. at 678-79. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at  685. 
 36 Id. at 685-86. 
 37 Id. at 685. 
 38 Id. at 683-84. 
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Tinker, indicating the important difference between the political speech 
of the armbands and the sexual content of Fraser’s speech.39  Unlike the 
penalties enforced against a political viewpoint, sanctions based on lewd 
and indecent speech were “entirely within [the school’s] permissible 
authority.”40  In addition, consideration was given to the young age and 
captive nature of the audience.41  The Court failed to make clear which 
factor, or mixture of factors, was the most significant.42 
3.  School-Sponsored Student Speech 
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, faced with student 
speech that was neither lewd nor offensive, and not actually uttered on 
school grounds, the Supreme Court imposed yet another standard to 
analyze the First Amendment challenge.43  There, a principal eliminated 
two pages of the school newspaper to remove articles concerning teen 
pregnancy and the impact of divorce on students.44  Giving weight to the 
school’s curriculum guidelines, the Court found no First Amendment 
violation because the school newspaper was not an entirely public forum 
for student speech.45 
Because Tinker merely answered the question of whether schools 
were required to tolerate particular student speech, the Hazelwood Court 
refused to apply the Tinker standard.46  Instead, it decided an 
independent standard may be necessary to “determin[e] when a school 
may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student 
expression.”47  Accordingly, no school offends the First Amendment 
when it restricts student speech “in school-sponsored expressive 
activities so long as [the administration’s] actions are reasonably related 
to legitimate 48
The Hazelwood dissent immediately questioned the departure from 
Tinker.49  It indicated that while the decision did not cast doubt on the 
viability of the long-standing precedent, it worked to create a “taxonomy 
 39 Id. at 680. 
 40 Id. at 685. 
 41 Id. at 684. 
 42 Klupinski, supra note 12, at 615. 
 43 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that school 
officials could reserve the right to reasonably restrict certain portions of a high school newspaper 
published by students in class). 
 44 Id. at 263-65. 
 45 Id. at 270. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 272-73. 
 48 Id. at 273. 
 49 Id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
7
Willard: Decoding Student Speech Rights
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
300 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
 
 
of school censorship” where Tinker may “appl[y] to one category [of 
student speech] and not another.”50  Consequently, this decision 
contributes to the confusion concerning the reach of Tinker as it applies 
to certain situations of student speech.51 
4.  Student Speech Promoting Illegal Drug Use 
A banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” was at the center of the 
Supreme Court’s latest decision to examine students’ rights under the 
First Amendment.52  In Morse v. Frederick, a student unfurled the banner 
on broadcast television while at an arguably school-sponsored social 
event celebrating the Olympic Torch Relay.53  School officials 
suspended him for encouraging illegal drug use.54  In finding that the 
speech was both on-campus and non-political speech, the Court found no 
violation of the student’s First Amendment rights.55
Struggling to apply precedent to this case, the Supreme Court found 
it necessary to create a distinct standard pertaining to student speech 
promoting illegal drug use.  The Court decided it was not obligated to 
apply Tinker, because Fraser and Hazelwood both established and 
confirmed the reality that Tinker did not produce an immutable analysis 
for student speech rights.56  Instead, the Court ruled that school officials 
may, without violating a student’s First Amendment rights, restrict 
student speech at a school event “when that speech is reasonably viewed 
as promoting illegal drug use.”57 
From these four Supreme Court decisions, there are numerous 
circumstances under which school officials can discipline students for 
speech.  The primary grounds for a school’s restriction of student speech 
turns on whether the student’s speech caused or could reasonably cause a 
material or substantial disruption, or collide with the rights of others as 
explained in Tinker.58  Fraser allows punishment for a student’s lewd or 
 50 Id. at 281. 
 51 Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 746 (“Courts have applied the Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier 
and, now, Morse standards in varying ways to decide Internet student speech cases.  Moreover, some 
courts have found that school officials lack disciplinary authority over student Internet expression 
altogether because of the expression’s off-campus nature.” (footnote omitted)). 
 52 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 53 Id. at 397-98. 
 54 Id. at 398. 
 55 Id. at 401-03. 
 56 Id. at 405-06. 
 57 Id. at 403. 
 58 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (holding that 
student’s free speech rights are violated when restricted unless the effect of the speech was a 
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obscene speech.59 Hazelwood allows a school’s restriction of speech that 
may be interpreted to represent the school.60  Finally, Morse allows the 
restriction of student speech that promotes illegal drug use.61 
B.  ANALYZING ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH: SPONSORSHIP, LOCATION, 
EFFECT, AND CONTENT 
1.  Lessons Learned from Supreme Court Precedent 
Four main factors can be identified as guiding the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of student free speech: sponsorship, location, effect, and 
content.62  Tinker provides the foundation for analyzing student speech 
based on its location, effect, and content.63  Tinker noted that within the 
boundary of the schoolhouse gate was an appropriate location for school 
officials to exert their authority over student speech.64  The effect of the 
black armbands was the pivotal focus of the decision, which held that, to 
merit restriction by school authorities, speech must cause or be 
reasonably likely to cause a “material[] and substantial[] disruption” or 
“collid[e] with the rights of others.”65  Finally, the Tinker Court 
considered the content of the speech, finding that the political nature of 
the speech deserved strong protection.66 
The content and location of the sexually explicit speech during a 
school assembly were the driving force in Fraser.67  Likewise, the latest 
Supreme Court decision, Morse, focused on the location and content of 
the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner during a school event to restrict 
student speech that promotes illegal drug use.68  Hazelwood authorizes a 
material or substantial interference with the discipline of the school or the speech invades the rights 
of another student). 
 59 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687 (1986) (holding that a student’s free 
speech rights were not violated based on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school 
assembly). 
 60 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that school 
officials could reserve the right to reasonably restrict certain portions of a high school newspaper 
published by students in class). 
 61 Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (holding that school officials may “restrict student speech at a 
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use”). 
 62 Klupinski, supra note 12, at 643. 
 63 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503. 
 64 Id. at 506. 
 65 Id. at 513. 
 66 Id. at 510-11. 
 67 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678-81 (1986). 
 68 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400-01 (2007). 
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school’s ability to restrict some student speech when the speech could be 
considered school-sponsored.69 
2.  The Absence of a Supreme Court Ruling on Online Student Speech 
Has Left Lower Courts in Chaos 
The divergent nature of free speech cases, coupled with the “special 
characteristics of the school environment,”70 may render one uniform 
rule inadequate to govern student speech cases.71  However, the current 
array of Supreme Court precedent provides little to no guidance as 
applied to online student speech cases.72 
It is unsurprising that lower courts have struggled in piecing 
together a coherent and consistent standard under which to analyze 
online student speech.73  The Internet is a “unique medium”74 that 
disseminates speech anywhere there is a connection to the web.75  To the 
detriment of the proper adjudication of such a complex First Amendment 
issue, lower courts are currently left to decide cases with precedent that 
cannot easily be applied to online student speech.76 
When the Court last addressed student speech rights in 2007, it 
missed an important chance to more carefully define the parameters of 
student speech that occurs outside of the traditional “schoolhouse 
gate.”77  Online student speech cases present a unique situation for 
schools, because otherwise applicable Supreme Court decisions limit 
school officials’ authority to regulate student speech that occurs within 
 69 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 70 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 71 See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685 (creating special exception to First Amendment protections 
allowing schools to punish lewd and obscene student speech at school functions); Hazelwood, 484 
U.S. at 271 (creating special exception to First Amendment protections allowing schools to regulate 
school-sponsored newspaper speech); Morse, 551 U.S. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining 
“the Court creates another exception” to Tinker). 
 72 Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 753 (“As their decisions clearly demonstrate, lower courts 
are left to their own devices in determining the proper bounds of school authority over student 
Internet speech.” (footnote omitted)). 
 73 See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625 (“With no clear understanding of when and how to 
evaluate Internet speech, the courts, as a result, have used an inconsistent application of standards 
and tests to the cases before them.”). 
 74 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997). 
 75 Servance, supra note 2, at 1237. 
 76 See, Louis John Seminski, Jr., Note, Tinkering with Student Free Speech: the Internet and 
the Need for a New Standard, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 176 (2001) (arguing that “in light of the ‘fuzzy’ 
precedents and their application to the Internet, many school boards settle the cases before trial in 
attempts to save on legal fees and taxpayer dollars”). 
 77 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
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Tinker’s “schoolhouse gate.”78  By focusing on the illegal drug use, the 
Morse Court also failed to provide a clear analysis for situations where 
the Tinker standard is inapplicable because the facts fall outside of the 
Court’s narrow exceptions.79 
Despite lower courts’ calls for guidance and a need for an 
articulated standard, the Court has not shown any urgency in resolving 
the matter in the near future.  Recently, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on three online student speech cases.80  At least two of the 
cases seem to be at odds: one case authorizes the punishment of a student 
for her online attacks against a fellow student,81 while the other finds the 
punishment of a student for his online attacks against his teacher a 
violation of his free speech rights.82  Lower courts must have guidance 
from the Court to prevent this type of flagrantly inconsistent application 
of First Amendment speech protection. 
II.  LOWER COURTS’ ANALYSIS OF ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH 
Though lower courts have properly identified the important factors 
influencing student speech rights cases—sponsorship, location, effect, 
and content—confusion is evident in the application of these factors.  
Extending precedent to online student speech cases has resulted in 
haphazard decisions with judges admittedly unsure of which standard to 
apply.83  A narrow reading of the Supreme Court’s four factors has 
hindered the lower courts’ ability to apply the principles to online student 
speech cases. 
A.  SPONSORSHIP 
The precedent of Hazelwood is directly applicable to school-
sponsored online student speech, and generally uncontested in student 
speech cases.84  Under Hazelwood, school officials have authority to 
restrict student speech that may reasonably be interpreted as being 
 78 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 79 Reeves, supra note 3, at 1147. 
 80 Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (cases below, 650 F.3d 915 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (en banc); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)); 
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (case below, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 81 See generally Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 82 See generally J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 83 Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625 (“With no clear understanding of when and how to 
evaluate Internet speech, the courts, as a result, have used an inconsistent application of standards 
and tests to the cases before them.”). 
 84 See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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school-sponsored.85  Any legitimate pedagogical purpose will be 
sufficient to restrict this type of student speech given the school’s 
continued interest in deciding when it chooses to “lend its name and 
resources to the dissemination of student expression.”86  A student’s 
online speech that is reasonably interpreted to be school-sponsored, bears 
the school’s name, or was created or disseminated using the school’s 
resources should be bound by this precedent.87  There is no difference 
between a school newspaper and a school blog when determining 
whether a student should be bound to the school’s authority. 
B.  LOCATION 
The Court famously noted in Tinker, “It can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”88  Tinker allowed the 
regulation of certain student speech within the boundaries of the 
“schoolhouse gate.”89  The Internet, however, is a “unique medium”90 
that allows speech created and communicated within the comfort of a 
student’s home to infiltrate the schoolhouse gate.91 
The location of the student’s online speech—a distinction between 
on-campus and off-campus speech—has proved to be a critical factor for 
courts in determining the constitutionality of online student speech 
regulation.92  Acknowledging the importance of the distinction between 
on-campus and off-campus speech, but not knowing the appropriate 
ways in which to classify them,93 courts are at a disadvantage from the 
beginning. 
The distinction between on-campus speech and off-campus speech 
is considered of utmost importance, because it is commonly held that 
schools have much less, if any, authority to discipline students for their 
 85 Id. at 272-73. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. at 273. 
 88 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997). 
 91 Servance, supra note 2, at 1235-36. 
 92 See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 643 (explaining how location was a critical factor, with 
“all of the courts but one examined whether the speech did or could have reasonably reached the 
physical school campus”). 
 93 Reeves, supra note 3, at 1141 (“The facts presented in Morse arguably did not point as 
clearly to an on-campus determination, and while the Court provided some relevant factors to use 
when the on- versus off-campus distinction is not clear, it failed to give any discernible guidance or a 
stand-alone test for students, administrators, and courts to follow.” (footnote omitted)). 
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off-campus online speech.94  One justification for this distinction is that 
off-campus speech is less likely than on-campus speech to disrupt the 
school environment.95  This justification, however, focuses on the 
potential location of the speech’s effect within the school rather than the 
location of the speech’s creation or reception.96  Another justification for 
the on-campus and off-campus distinction calls into question the ability 
of school authorities to arbitrarily reach into students’ homes to promote 
their own agenda.97 
In attempting to apply the current Supreme Court precedent to the 
unique challenges presented by speech that begins within a student’s 
home, lower courts have been inconsistent at best.98  The very 
classification of on-campus and off-campus speech can be manipulated 
depending on whether a certain jurisdiction holds a narrow or expansive 
definition.99  While a narrow definition may deprive school authorities of 
disciplinary actions for online student speech, an expansive definition 
may subject students to an overbroad regulation of online expression.100 
Lower courts’ attempts to manipulate facts in order to fit an already 
haphazard classification often result in further inconsistencies.101  
Particularly, dependence on a nexus between the speech and the school 
has thus far resulted in a tenuous geographic analysis.102  According to 
some courts, any geographical nexus, no matter how thin, may warrant 
school authority over online student speech.103  Reliance on a 
determination of the location of online student speech leads to decisions 
 94 See Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 758. 
 95 Sandy S. Li, Note, The Need for a New, Uniform Standard: The Continued Threat to 
Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 65, 92 (2005). 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 758. 
 98 See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625 (“With no clear understanding of when and how to 
evaluate Internet speech, the courts, as a result, have used an inconsistent application of standards 
and tests to the cases before them.”). 
 99 Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 757. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 754. 
 102 Klupinski, supra note 12, at 627 (“The geographical approach is arguably the easiest one 
courts can employ to determine whether Internet speech created off school campus can be subject to 
school discipline. This approach looks at whether a sufficient nexus exists between the speech and 
the school simply by determining whether the speech was physically created or ever accessed on 
school grounds.”). 
 103 Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-78 (E.D. Mo. 1998) 
(leaving the question of whether a student’s online speech, which was accessed on campus without 
his permission, could subject him to discipline by the school); see also Kara D. Williams, Comment, 
Public Schools vs. MySpace and Facebook: The Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 707, 720 (2008) (“First, courts have interpreted differently the distinction between on-
campus and off-campus speech, with some courts defining on-campus speech much more 
expansively than other courts.”). 
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that turn on an insubstantial detail, which results in an unclear 
understanding of students’ First Amendment speech rights. 
As a “borderless, ubiquitous medium,”104 the Internet has the 
potential to invade the school environment, despite the fact that the 
actual expression almost always occurs physically outside school 
property.105  The Internet is simply different than other, more traditional, 
means of communication.106  Specifically, it is pervasive, it allows users 
to disseminate information to millions of people immediately and easily, 
and it can be accessed anywhere.107  The growing accessibility of the 
Internet through mobile phones, personal laptops, and computer tablets 
further expands the problem of relying on location.  Any online speech 
may be retrieved on school campus during school hours by the “click of 
a mouse.”108 
The distinction between on-campus and off-campus speech is 
antiquated and inapplicable to online student speech cases.109  The 
physical location of the speech is irrelevant given the ability of the 
Internet to trespass upon the school environment.110  Rather than labeling 
online speech as “on-campus” or “off-campus,” the unique nature of the 
Internet should be embraced and online speech should be examined as a 
unique classification.111 
C.  EFFECT 
The original student speech case, Tinker, was decided with a focus 
on the effect of the student’s speech.112  A student whose speech had the 
 104 Servance, supra note 2, at 1237. 
 105 Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 757 (“As a practical matter, the expression at issue in 
Internet-related student speech cases almost always occurs ‘off-campus.’”). 
 106 Servance, supra note 2, at 1235 (“Not only is Internet speech ever-present but one can also 
quickly and easily disseminate its content to an infinite number of people.”). 
 107 Li, supra note 95, at 93 (“The Internet differs from other traditional mediums of 
expression, such as flyers, newspapers, and public speeches, for several reasons: (1) it is pervasive, 
(2) it allows users to disseminate information to millions of people immediately and easily, and (3) it 
can be accessed anywhere.”). 
 108 Reeves, supra note 3, at 1149. 
 109 Servance, supra note 2, at 1235 (“Given this inherently different mode of expression, the 
old distinctions physically demarcating authority over student speech to on or off campus are not 
adequate, especially as applied to children in a school setting.”). 
 110 See id. at 1237. 
 111 Li, supra note 95, at 93 (arguing for a separate standard for online speech: “Because the 
Internet is a unique medium that allows people to anonymously express their views, thereby 
encouraging free speech and ideas, a separate standard is needed to ensure that . . . the anonymous 
expression of students’ views over the Internet will be protected.” (footnote omitted)). 
 112 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (focusing on 
the effect of the student’s speech—a “substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others”—as the 
basis for school authorities’ ability to restrict student speech). 
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effect of “material[] and substantial[] interfer[ence] . . . in the operation 
of the school” or has “collid[ed] with the rights of others” may suffer 
appropriate discipline at the hands of school officials.113  The Internet 
has exacerbated the already complex nature of student speech.114  Online 
student speech may begin in a student’s home, but it has a unique ability 
to carry on and have an effect on the school.115 
Lower courts consistently analyze online student speech cases under 
the Tinker standard, but rarely rely on it as a sole justification for the 
proscription of online student speech.116  Though the basis of the 
decision in Tinker was the effect of the students’ speech, the famous 
boundary of the schoolhouse gate causes hesitation among judges to 
extend the boundary to speech that is created outside of the school but 
nevertheless permeates the school environment.117  After performing a 
full Tinker analysis, courts abandon the Tinker focus on the effect felt 
within the 118
The effect of a student’s speech has long been an important factor in 
assessing student speech rights, and should continue to govern online 
student speech.  This fundamental factor in assessing a student’s rights 
should not be abandoned just because the speech is expressed through an 
ever-present means of communication.  If a student’s online speech 
causes, or could foreseeably cause, a substantial disruption within the 
school, school officials should maintain their interest in providing a safe 
learning environment. 
D.  CONTENT 
Generally, speech may not be restricted based on its content.119  
There are, however, “special characteristics of the school environment” 
 113 Id. 
 114 Seminski, supra note 76, at 182. 
 115 Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (“We can, of course, 
envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial disruption within the school from 
some remote locale.”). 
 116 Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625-41. 
 117 See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). But see Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. 
Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2011) (school-imposed discipline for webpage created to 
ridicule another student, because it was likely that student’s online speech would reach school, given 
that speech was targeted toward fellow students). 
 118 See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 626 (“Some [courts] will only engage in a Tinker analysis, 
while others will also analyze under Fraser and examine the content of the speech to determine 
whether it is lewd or vulgar.”). 
 119 E.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“As a general matter, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 
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that allow school officials greater authority to control the content of the 
student speech in order to provide a safe learning environment.120  
Fraser and Morse defined narrow exceptions to the general Tinker rule 
that schools may not restrict student speech because of a simple desire to 
avoid unpopular viewpoints.121  School officials have the authority to 
restrict the content of student speech if it is lewd or obscene, or if the 
speech promotes illegal drug use.122 
The Internet, as an intangible medium, blurs the line between the 
completely unrestricted right to free speech students enjoy outside of the 
school environment and the right of schools to control the learning 
environment within the schoolhouse gate.  There is a great fear that 
extending Fraser or Morse to online student speech will allow schools to 
reach into students’ homes and restrict speech that would otherwise be 
protected under the First Amendment.  Accordingly, lower courts are 
hesitant to rely exclusively on Fraser or Morse when analyzing online 
student speech.123 
It is, however, the very content of online student speech that will 
impact any potential effect the speech has within the school.  If the 
content of a student’s online speech does not possess a clear connection 
to the school, it is unlikely to ever come to the attention of school 
officials.  When, however, the content of online student speech connects 
the student’s expression to the school environment such that it could 
materially or substantially disrupt the school or collide with the rights of 
other students, the school will likely be able to serve its function to 
prohibit certain speech in public discourse.124 
III.   FUTURE COURTS SHOULD FOCUS ON THE EFFECT AND CONTENT OF 
ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH 
The location, effect, and content factors governing student speech 
cases have been interpreted inconsistently as applied to online student 
speech.  The Hazelwood standard is directly applicable to online student 
 120 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 121 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Morse v. Frederick, 551 
U.S. 393 (2007); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (“In order for the State in the person of school 
officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its 
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness 
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”). 
 122 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (holding that a student’s free speech rights were not violated based 
on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school assembly); Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 
(holding that school officials may “restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is 
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use”). 
 123 Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625. 
 124 See generally Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
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speech cases where the school could reasonably be seen to have 
sponsored the speech.125  The location of online student speech has 
confused the application of Tinker, Fraser, and Morse because the 
disputed speech in each case was communicated within the boundaries of 
the schoolhouse gate, or during a school-sponsored event.126  Online 
student speech can intrude on the school environment via mobile phones, 
personal laptops, computer tablets, or any Internet connection.127  The 
on-campus and off-campus distinction drawn by lower courts is 
inapplicable to online speech cases, because it is irrelevant, given the 
ability of the Internet to intrude upon the school environment.128  Instead, 
the effect and content of online student speech should guide the analysis 
of whether a school has the right to discipline a student for the student’s 
online speech. 
A.  TINKER PROVIDES THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD TO ANALYZE 
ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH 
Though the Internet has created a new and advanced medium 
through which students may communicate,129 until the Supreme Court 
provides further guidance, the principles set forth by Tinker outline the 
proper guidelines under which to analyze online student speech.  Tinker 
should be applied to online speech, because it sets the standard under 
which students may be punished for their speech while simultaneously 
providing constitutional safeguards to protect students’ rights.130  Tinker 
is the Supreme Court decision on student speech rights that provides an 
appropriately comprehensive, yet flexible, standard to embrace the 
growing arena of technology. 
Under Tinker, school authorities may not proscribe student speech 
when the speech does not “materially and substantially interfer[e] with 
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,” 
 125 Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625-26 (explaining that “[a]t the outset, it must be noted that 
the cases involving school-sponsored speech generally do not pose issues for schools” when applied 
to Internet speech). 
 126 Id.; see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Morse, 551 U.S. at 393. 
 127 Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 757 (“As a practical matter, the expression at issue in 
Internet-related student speech cases almost always occurs ‘off-campus.’”). 
 128 Servance, supra note 2, at 1237 (“[O]ff-campus status becomes a somewhat false barrier to 
school authority.”). 
 129 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997). 
 130 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (stating that students may freely express their opinions as long 
as they do not materially and substantially interfere with school discipline or with the rights of 
others). 
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or when the speech does not “collid[e] with the rights of others.”131  Both 
prongs of Tinker are applicable and should be considered when analyzing 
online student speech.132 
The first prong should be applied generally to grant schools the 
power to discipline a student whose online speech has created a 
substantial disruption within the school.133  The idea that the student 
expression is created outside of the school should not eclipse the reality 
that online speech nevertheless has the ability to penetrate the school 
environment and cause a material disruption.134 
The second prong of Tinker, the “invasion of the rights of others” 
prong, has been established as a legitimate justification for the 
proscription of certain student speech.135 As applied to student speech 
cases, this prong is triggered when the speech amounts to “harassment or 
[has] some type of serious emotive impact.”136  Just as it was important 
for the Court to regulate speech that affects the overall ability of schools 
to maintain “appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,”137 it is 
also important to protect every student’s right “to be secure and to be let 
alone.”138 
In addition to offering a practical standard under which to analyze 
student speech, Tinker also deters impulsive actions by school authorities 
that may infringe upon students’ free speech rights by providing clear 
guidelines for restriction of speech.139 Allowing Tinker to govern online 
 131 See id. at 509 (holding that school officials may justify restriction on student expression 
only by demonstrating that they had reason to anticipate that the conduct would “‘materially and 
substantially interfer[e] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school’ [or] collid[e] with the rights of others”). 
 132 See generally Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 763-70. 
 133 Id. at 768-69 (“If the school does not claim that the student’s Internet expression was 
threatening or constituted harassment, or if the school fails to justify its punishment under the ‘rights 
of others’ prong, then the school must prove that the expression caused a ‘material and substantial 
disruption’ in the school environment.  Here, the punishment should be subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny and courts should not relax the ‘substantial disruption’ prong, as some have in prior 
Internet-related student speech cases.”). 
 134 To the extent that it is possible, disruption caused by school authorities’ investigation and 
reaction to the speech should be separated from disruption caused solely by the speech, when 
determining whether a material disruption occurred. 
 135 See West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(“[W]here school authorities reasonably believe that a student’s uncontrolled exercise of expression 
might substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other 
students, they may forbid such expression.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 136 Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 765. 
 137 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (quoting 
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 138 Id. at 508. 
 139 See id. at 513 (explaining that students may freely express their opinions as long as they do 
not materially and substantially interfere with school discipline or with the rights of others). 
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student speech has led to fear that a school may have the ability to extend 
its control within a student’s home to discipline students for “deviat[ing] 
from the values that the school wishes to promote.”140  Tinker, however, 
works to further ensure protection of students’ free speech rights by 
holding the school responsible for showing that its disciplinary action 
“was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint.”141  This safeguard will be an important consideration, and 
any motivation to deter certain speech should be inspected carefully.142 
The Supreme Court provided Tinker as an acceptable compromise 
between the free speech rights of students and school authorities’ interest 
in maintaining authority within the school.143  School authorities should 
be able to protect the school environment against online student speech, 
just as they are authorized to restrict expression that occurs within the 
“schoolhouse gate.”144  If a student’s online speech substantially disrupts 
the school or impinges upon the rights of another person at the school,145 
an unmistakable nexus between the speech and the school has been 
formed.  A complication of the boundless nature of the Internet emerges 
when a student’s speech is disciplined before the speech has the 
opportunity to affect the school. 
B.  REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY 
The First Amendment does not require schools to wait for 
disruption within the school in order to proscribe certain student 
speech.146  To the contrary, school officials have a duty to prevent such 
disruption from occurring in the first place.147  Tinker not only authorizes 
restriction of student expression when there is an actual disruption felt 
within the school, but also if there is reasonable forecast of such 
 140 Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 758. 
 141 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 142 Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 768-69 (“Here, the punishment should be subject to strict 
judicial scrutiny and courts should not relax the ‘substantial disruption’ prong, as some have in prior 
Internet-related student speech cases.”). 
 143 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503. 
 144 Id. at 506. 
 145 Id. at 513. 
 146 See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 591-92 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Tinker does not require 
school officials to wait until the horse has left the barn before closing the door.  Nor does Tinker 
‘require certainty that disruption will occur.’. . .  Tinker does not require certainty, only that the 
forecast of substantial disruption be reasonable.”). 
 147 See Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he First Amendment does not 
require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act.  In fact, they 
have a duty to prevent the occurrence of disturbances.” (footnote omitted)). 
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disruption.148  The possibilities for free speech violations against students 
could be insurmountable if schools are not merely authorized, but rather 
required, to discipline online student speech that has the mere potential to 
reach the school and have an effect. 
The Second Circuit, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education, affirmed 
school officials’ authority to discipline a student for his online 
expression, finding it reasonably foreseeable that the expression would 
come to the attention of school officials.149 Appropriately applying 
Tinker,150 the court found the risk of substantial disruption “not only 
reasonable, but clear.”151 
The Wisniewski decision presents possible factors to be considered 
when determining whether it is reasonably foreseeable that certain online 
student speech may substantially disrupt the school.152  In that case, a 
student created a drawing of a gun firing a bullet at a person’s head, 
including images of splattered blood, captioned “Kill Mr. 
VanderMolen.”153  The icon was displayed for three weeks and the 
student sent instant messages with the icon to fifteen people, at least 
some of which were his classmates.154  The court determined that the 
“extensive distribution of it, . . . during a three-week circulation period, 
made [the risk of the speech coming to the attention of school 
authorities] at least foreseeable to a reasonable person, if not 
inevitable.”155 
Because of the boundless nature of the Internet, any online speech 
has the potential to reach the school.  The Wisniewski court did not 
identify the distinguishing factor that will determine how the threat of 
disruption caused by online speech will cross the threshold of 
 148 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (suggesting that the decision in the case might have been different 
if there had been “evidence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the 
armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of 
other students”). 
 149 See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We are in agreement, 
however, that . . . it was reasonably foreseeable that the [instant message] icon would come to the 
attention of school authorities and the teacher whom the icon depicted being shot.”). 
 150 See id. at 40 (finding, after an analysis of the facts, that there could be “no doubt that the 
icon, once made known to the teacher and other school officials, would foreseeably create a risk of 
substantial disruption within the school environment”). 
 151 Id. 
 152 See id. at 39-40 (listing four factors to justify the student’s punishment: the content of the 
speech, the “extensive distribution” of the speech, the targeting of classmates as the audience for the 
speech, and the circulation period of the speech). 
 152 Id. at 36. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 39-40. 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/5
2013] Decoding Student Speech Rights 313 
 
“reasonable foreseeability.”156  One standard that embraces the 
Wisniewski decision looks to the context in which a student 
communicates online speech—if the student communicates online 
speech within the scope of his or her position as a student, it is more 
reasonably foreseeable that the speech will have an effect within the 
school.157 
Speech occurs “within the scope of a student” if the speech would 
not have occurred, but for the fact that the speaker was a student.158 For 
example: “[W]hen a student posts a message on his or her website that 
contains derogatory references to his or her principal, the but-for inquiry 
would be answered in the negative: But for the fact that the speaker was 
a student at the principal’s school, the speech would not have 
occurred.”159  While this standard has been offered to reconcile the on-
campus/off-campus distinction,160 it has bearing on whether the student’s 
speech will be subject to school authority based on the effect of that 
speech.  If the controversial online speech occurred “within the scope of 
his or her status as a student,”161 the odds increase that the speech has the 
reasonable foreseeability to reach the school and ultimately have an 
effect. 
Online speech targeting an audience of other students will also 
increase the likelihood of the online speech reaching the attention of 
school officials.162  Purposefully targeting members of the school by 
accessing the speech at school, inviting other students to view the 
speech, or informing other students of the speech and how to access it 
will work to “facilitate[] the on-campus nature of the speech,” and bring 
it under the umbrella of Tinker.163 
The effect of online student speech is at the center of analyzing 
online student speech cases.  Tinker’s standard is highly applicable and 
 156 See id. at 39 (“We are in agreement, however, that, on the undisputed facts, it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the [instant message] icon would come to the attention of school 
authorities and the teacher whom the icon depicted being shot.”). 
 157 See Reeves, supra note 3, at 1157-62 (arguing that online speech communicated within the 
scope of a student’s status as such should be within school authority to restrict). 
 158 Id. at 1157. 
 159 Id. at 1157-58. 
 160 Id. at 1154 (applying the “scope of a student” standard to decipher whether the online 
student speech should be considered on-campus or off-campus speech). 
 161 Id. at 1157. 
 162 See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that it 
was likely a student’s online speech would reach the school, given that the speech was targeted 
toward fellow students). 
 163 See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) (“J.S., nevertheless, 
facilitated the on-campus nature of the speech by accessing the web site on a school computer in a 
classroom, showing the site to another student, and by informing other students at school of the 
existence of the web site.”). 
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should be used when a school has a “constitutionally valid reason to 
regulate” such speech.164  Reconciling the problem of whether it is 
reasonably foreseeable that online student speech may cause an effect 
within the school, courts should look to whether the speaker 
communicated as a student.165  As a contributing factor to the effect of a 
student’s online speech, the very content of the student’s expression must 
also be scrutinized. 
C.  THREE CATEGORIES SHOULD GUIDE COURTS IN ASSESSING THE 
CONTENT OF ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH: OUTRAGEOUS OR 
INHERENTLY DISRUPTIVE SPEECH, FOCUSED OR TARGETED 
OFFENSIVE SPEECH, AND GENERAL SCHOOL-RELATED SPEECH 
Certainly not every Internet communication made by a student in 
his or her home will be subject to consequences imposed by school 
authorities.  Though the effect of student speech determines the ultimate 
standard under which schools may proscribe student speech, it is the 
content of the speech that presents schools with disciplinary authority.  
Tinker originally announced the need to protect the content of student 
speech under the First Amendment.166  Fraser provided that the content 
of students’ speech alone, when it is lewd or obscene, may provide an 
immediate basis for schools to dispense appropriate punishment.167  
Likewise, Morse rendered student speech promoting illegal drug use 
strictly unprotected within the school environment.168 
The Supreme Court has provided narrow categories governing the 
First Amendment protections of student speech.169  Lower courts, 
however, should analyze the content of online student speech more 
broadly to better apply Supreme Court precedent. This Comment offers 
three categories that should serve as a guideline under which to analyze 
 164 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (“In the 
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are 
entitled to freedom of expression of their views.”). 
 165 See Reeves, supra note 3, at 1157 (arguing that online speech communicated within the 
scope of a student’s status as such should be within school authority to restrict). 
 166 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (holding that students may freely express their opinions as 
long as they do not materially and substantially interfere with school discipline or with the rights of 
others). 
 167 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687 (1986) (holding that a student’s free 
speech rights were not violated based on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school 
assembly). 
 168 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (holding that school officials may “restrict 
student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug 
use”). 
 169 See discussion supra Part I. 
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the content of the expression in online student speech cases: outrageous 
or inherently disruptive speech, focused or targeted offensive speech, 
general school-related speech. 
1.  Outrageous or Inherently Disruptive Speech 
There are certainly some types of speech that need not be tolerated 
in a school setting.170  While the First Amendment provides citizens with 
wide latitude to free speech,171 some categories of speech have been 
deemed simply unacceptable in public discourse.172  Courts have defined 
narrow categories of speech that the state may punish, including libel, 
obscenity, and incitement.173  Types of conduct that are unprotected in 
general society are just as intolerable in the educational system.174  
Moreover, “the special characteristics of the school environment” further 
restrict the behaviors considered acceptable in schools.175  Speech that 
falls outside of the constitutional expression of opinion will not even be 
afforded the protection of Tinker.176 
The category of outrageous or inherently disruptive speech is meant 
to classify speech that may invade upon the rights of others so greatly 
that, by its very nature, it will “materially disrupt[] classwork or 
involve[] substantial disorder.”177  Just as some types of speech are so 
inappropriate that they may warrant punishment when delivered in a 
school auditorium,178 students should be held accountable for outrageous 
and inappropriate speech that invades the school but was expressed 
through the Internet.  When a student is the subject of a targeted attack 
by another student, it will undoubtedly result in the loss of at least part of 
 170 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (“Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school 
education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”). 
 171 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 172 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 173 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 254; Miller, 413 U.S. at 15; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 
at 444. 
 174 See Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public 
School Jurisdiction over Students’ Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1604 (2009) (“[S]tatutes in 
many states allow a school to suspend a student who is charged with a felony committed on or off 
campus, and expel a student who is convicted of a felony if the school administrator determines that 
‘the student’s continued presence in school would have a substantial detrimental effect on the 
general welfare of the school.’” (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37H1/2 (1996))). 
 175 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 176 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 177 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (1969). 
 178 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
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the targeted student’s opportunity to learn.179  If this results, the school 
has failed in its ability to maintain a safe learning environment. Two 
examples of when a students’ online speech will be inherently within the 
domain of school officials are true threats and “cyberbullying.” 
a.  True Treats 
True threats are not a constitutionally protected expression of 
speech, and are therefore never accepted in public discourse.180  In light 
of the events at Columbine High School in 1999 and similar subsequent 
events, school administrators have become increasingly vigilant about 
student speech that threatens the safety of students and teachers alike.181  
If a court determines a student’s online speech amounts to a true threat, it 
will not be protected within the umbrella of Tinker.182 
b.  Cyberbullying 
“Cyberbullying” has been a topic controversial enough to warrant a 
recent conference hosted at the White House by President Barack Obama 
and First Lady Michelle Obama.183  Though bullying is not a new 
concept, the Internet makes it easier for bullies to prey on their victims.  
 179 See Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 767 (“If the student’s Internet expression constituted 
‘severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive’ harassment and interfered with another student’s 
‘opportunity to learn,’ then punishment will be justified under Tinker’s ‘rights of others’ prong.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 180 See Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Threats of 
physical violence are not protected by the First Amendment under either federal or state law, and as 
a result, it does not matter to our analysis that Sarah Lovell uttered her comments while at school.  
To resolve the federal claim, we need not rely upon the Supreme Court cases that limit students’ free 
speech rights; because we hold that threats such as Lovell’s are not entitled to First Amendment 
protection in any forum, it does not matter that the statement was made by a student in the school 
context.”). 
 181 See Li, supra note 95, at 66 (“The primary issue addressed in Internet-related student 
speech cases is whether the school violated the student’s First Amendment rights when it disciplined 
the student for posting allegedly vulgar, violent, or lewd material on the Internet unrelated to any 
school-sponsored activity or event.  Many of these cases cited the Columbine tragedy to support the 
proposition that schools must be given greater authority to effectively minimize violent student 
behavior.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 182 See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 371 (“Threats of physical violence are not protected by the First 
Amendment under either federal or state law, and as a result, it does not matter to our analysis that 
Sarah Lovell uttered her comments while at school.  To resolve the federal claim, we need not rely 
upon the Supreme Court cases that limit students’ free speech rights; because we hold that threats 
such as Lovell’s are not entitled o First Amendment protection in any forum, it does not matter that 
the statement was made by a student in the school context.”). 
 183 The Office of the White House, President Obama & the First Lady: Conference on 
Bullying Prevention (Mar. 10, 2011), available at www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2011/03/10/president-obama-first-lady-conference-bullying-prevention/. 
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“Cyberbullying” is defined as a “willful and repeated harm inflicted 
through the use of computers, cell phones, and other electronic 
devices.”184  As of January 2013, forty-nine states require school policies 
prohibiting cyberbullying and forty-three states allow schools to 
implement sanctions against cyberbully students.185  Because, according 
to the Department of Education, legal action can be taken against schools 
that do not address this harassment, schools must respond appropriately 
to cyberbullying.186 
Though the legislature has made it clear that Internet harassment 
should be a priority of school officials, the Supreme Court recently 
denied certiorari on a case disputing the constitutionality of a school’s 
disciplinary actions against a student for an online attack upon a fellow 
student by creating an interactive discussion group on MySpace.187  The 
Fourth Circuit punished the student who invited approximately one 
hundred people, including at least two dozen of her classmates, to join a 
MySpace group entitled “S.A.S.H.”—an acronym for “Students Against 
Shay’s [the targeted student’s] Herpes.”188  The responses garnered from 
the school’s students, in the form of comments and pictures, amounted to 
no less than a hate campaign against the targeted student.189  While the 
most offensive speech did not come from the original speaker, she 
created the forum and fueled the hateful speech with approving 
comments.190 
This type of personal attack through the Internet will inescapably 
collide with the victim’s right “to be secure and to be let alone,”191 and 
ultimately prevent the school from providing each student the 
opportunity to learn.192  For this reason, when online student speech 
 184 SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, BULLYING BEYOND THE SCHOOLYARD: 
PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO CYBERBULLYING 5 (2009). 
 185 SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS (Jan. 2013), 
available at www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf. 
 186 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: BULLYING AND HARASSMENT, WHITE 
HOUSE CONFERENCE MATERIALS 2011, at 83, available at www.stopbullying.gov/resources-
files/white-house-conference-2011-materials.pdf. 
 187 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012). 
 188 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567-68 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 189 Id. at 568-69 (“School administrators concluded that Kowalski had created a ‘hate 
website,’ in violation of the school policy against ‘harassment, bullying, and intimidation.’”). 
 190 Id. at 568 (“Parsons uploaded a photograph of himself and a friend holding their noses 
while displaying a sign that read, ‘Shay Has Herpes,’ referring to Shay N.  The record of the 
webpage shows that Kowalski promptly responded, stating, ‘Ray you are soo funny!=).’”). 
 191 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
 192 See West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(“[W]here school authorities reasonably believe that a student’s uncontrolled exercise of expression 
might substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other 
students, they may forbid such expression.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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amounts to true threats or cyberbullying, courts should authorize 
discipline without the protection of Tinker. 
2.  Focused or Targeted Offensive Speech 
Lewd, vulgar, or otherwise patently offensive online student speech 
causes a unique dilemma for schools.193  While this type of speech has 
plagued schools for decades and quite possibly centuries, the Internet 
takes the speech from adolescents’ private conversations or passed notes 
to an infinitely public platform.  Distasteful, and sometimes downright 
nasty, Internet remarks about teachers, other students, or school-related 
activities have left many questions unresolved, resulting in inconsistent 
case law.194  While bullying is its own unique category, online offensive 
speech directed toward the school continues to leave school authorities 
searching for a strategy to protect its own officials and other students.195 
Fraser and Tinker would normally be the most applicable Supreme 
Court precedents for analyzing offensive speech within schools.196  
While Fraser has historically been limited to on-campus speech,197 the 
principles supporting the ruling should still be applied to online speech.  
The Fraser Court endorsed punishment of the student’s lewd speech, 
because the Court deemed it a “highly appropriate function of public 
school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in 
public discourse.”198  It further explained that schools were not limited 
by the Constitution from “insisting that certain modes of expression are 
inappropriate and subject to sanctions.”199  The speech in question was 
sexually explicit in nature, but the Court expanded its ruling to include 
 193 See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 626 (“Further complicating matters, these courts also 
differ on which standards to apply if the speech is considered student speech.  Some will only 
engage in a Tinker analysis, while others will also analyze under Fraser and examine the content of 
the speech to determine whether it is lewd or vulgar.”). 
 194 See Jacob Tabor, Students’ First Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet: Off-Campus 
Cyberspeech and School Regulation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 561, 591 (2009) (“The question of school 
regulation of off-campus cyberspeech is a challenging one that the Supreme Court has not directly 
resolved.”). 
 195 See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 626 (“Further complicating matters, these courts also 
differ on which standards to apply if the speech is considered student speech.  Some will only 
engage in a Tinker analysis, while others will also analyze under Fraser and examine the content of 
the speech to determine whether it is lewd or vulgar.”). 
 196 See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). The lewd and 
vulgar content of Fraser’s speech was the focus of the justification for punishment. Id. at 685–86. 
 197 See generally id.  The Court included the location of the speech—in front of a young, 
captive audience—as a justification for the student’s punishment. Id. at 684–86. 
 198 Id. at 684. 
 199 Id. 
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vulgar and lewd speech that may “undermine the school’s basic 
educational mission.”200 
Fraser alone could not adequately justify authorizing school 
authorities to punish all students for their lewd, vulgar, or offensive 
online speech.201  The underlying principles of Tinker and Fraser should 
be used to analyze offensive online speech that is targeted at the school. 
While schools have the ability to “prohibit the use of vulgar and 
offensive terms in public discourse,”202 schools must be held accountable 
by showing a disruption to the school or invasion upon the rights of 
another student and justify restrictions on a particular expression of 
opinion.203 
a. Parody Profiles 
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari on two exceptionally 
similar cases involving two unrelated Pennsylvania students’ creation of 
parody MySpace profiles of their respective school principals.204  Both 
students created the profiles in their homes, used school resources only to 
obtain a picture of the principal, and incorporated offensive, if not cruel, 
language in the parody profiles.205  The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, 
struggled with analysis of all previous student speech Supreme Court 
cases only to ultimately decide Tinker is the applicable rule, because of 
the off-campus nature of the speech.206 
Under Tinker, these cases are only subject to the material and 
substantial disruption analysis, because the Tinker Court specified that 
the rights of other students—not school officials—be protected from 
invasion.207  Fraser, however, may provide respite for teachers from 
offensive attacks while the requirement that schools show more than 
 200 Id. at 685. 
 201 See Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 (2d 
Cir. 2008). The court reasoned that applying Fraser alone would allow a school to censor speech it 
deemed vulgar, offensive, or otherwise contrary to the school’s mission, without having to show 
substantial disruption. Id. 
 202 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
 203 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 204 Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (cases below, 650 F.3d 915 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (en banc); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)). 
 205 See generally J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); 
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 206 See generally J.S., 650 F.3d 915; Layshock, 650 F.3d 205. 
 207 Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 765 (“If the student’s Internet expression constituted 
‘severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive’ harassment and interfered with another student’s 
‘opportunity to learn,’ then punishment will be justified under Tinker’s ‘rights of other’s’ prong.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance”208 will place 
significant safeguards to prevent against knee-jerk reactions by school 
officials to protect against healthy disapproval. 
b.  Indecent Photographs 
The use of social networking websites209 centered on sharing 
personal pictures has created an entire sub-section of student conduct that 
school officials attempt to address through school discipline.210  Though 
the pictures may not target the school specifically, school officials have 
exerted their authority and disciplined students nevertheless.211  Future 
courts should apply Tinker and Fraser principles to online student speech 
cases involving possibly indecent photographs. 
Judge Philip P. Simon said it best when he declared, “Not much 
good takes place at slumber parties for high school kids, and this case 
proves the point.”212  Two high school students, fifteen and sixteen years 
old, were suspended for posing for and posting “raunchy” pictures of 
themselves on their MySpace, Facebook and Photo Bucket accounts.213  
The pictures displayed the girls fully clothed or in lingerie in suggestive 
positions and were taken at a series of slumber parties during the middle 
of the summer.214  Captions describing the pictures were lewd, making 
reference to the male anatomy in less than decent terms.215  Though the 
pictures were taken in the summer within a student’s home, printouts of 
the pictures were brought to the school by parents who were concerned 
about the effects of the pictures.216  Both students were disciplined 
because the principal found that the pictures had a “potential for causing 
disruption of student activities.”217 
Though the pictures were indecent,218 they were found to be an 
attempt at a “particularized message of crude humor likely to be 
understood by those they expected to view the conduct”219 rather than 
 208 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 209 See, e.g., Tumblr.com; instagr.am/. 
 210 See, e.g., T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 211 See, e.g., id. 
 212 Id. at 771. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. at 772. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 772-73. 
 218 The district court found the pictures not to be obscene according to the legal definition, 
and therefore not inherently offensive.  Id. at 778. 
 219 T.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 776. 
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“deviate sexual conduct.”220  The court assumed, without definitively 
deciding, that was the default rule applicable to this case after an initial 
attempt to incorporate Fraser was defeated by a classification of “off-
campus” speech.221  Ultimately, the court found nothing in the record 
that would “come close to meeting” the Tinker standard, and held that 
school officials did violate the students’ constitutional rig 222
A school’s interest in “prohibit[ing] the use of vulgar and offensive 
[speech] in public discourse”223 should be considered in offensive online 
student speech cases.  Even if there is an overwhelming interest for the 
school to restrict lewd and obscene speech within the public discourse, as 
described in Fraser, the Tinker standard would still work to prevent the 
school from punishing students for indecent pictures if they do not 
“material[ly] disrupt[] classwork or involve[] substantial disorder or 
inva[de] . . . the rights of others.”224 
3.  General School-Related Speech 
Allowing schools to reach into students’ homes and wield control 
over any language created within the scope of the speaker’s status as a 
student would be unconstitutional.225  General school-related speech 
does not trigger the second prong of Tinker—a collision with the rights 
of other students—because it does not include speech directed at any 
specific student.  Online student speech that generally relates to the 
school will be subject to Tinker’s “material and substantial disruption” 
prong,226 and will be punishable accordingly. 
It is an established concept that even when online speech is 
expressed outside of the school, it may nevertheless have an effect within 
the school.227  In the Second Circuit, a student council member posted a 
lewd, inaccurate blog post regarding a school-sponsored social event.228  
 220 Id. at 778. 
 221 Id. at 779. 
 222 Id. at 779-85. 
 223 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
 224 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 225 Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet 
Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 161 (2003) (“Schools that punish students for wearing Marilyn 
Manson t-shirts or waving confederate flags at school do not attempt to discipline students for doing 
so off-campus, yet off-campus criticism of school authority is far more likely to result in academic 
punishment.”). 
 226 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 227 Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (“We can, of course, 
envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial disruption within the school from 
some remote locale.”). 
 228 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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School officials postponed the event multiple times when a final 
postponement due to technical arrangements upset the Senior Class 
Secretary enough to send a mass email to school members and post to 
her personal blog about the issue.229  Though the event was merely 
postponed, the contentious blog entry claimed it was cancelled due to the 
“douchebags in central office.”230  In both the email and blog entry, the 
student calls for outraged students to contact school officials—
specifically her superintendent—who she claimed got “pissed off” and 
decided to call off the event.231 
Mildly vulgar by today’s standards, the blog entry would likely not 
trigger the Fraser interest of the school.232  Instead, it is the directed call 
of action encouraging phone calls and emails to school officials that 
caused a disruption.233  In response to the students’ online speech, both 
the principal and superintendent received such an influx of both phone 
calls and emails regarding the event that they arrived late to, or were 
forced to miss, several school-related activities for at least two 
consecutive days.234 
While acknowledging the “vulgar” nature of the speech, the court 
found that the “potentially incendiary language”235 did cause a 
“foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the work and discipline of 
the school.”236  The school did not violate the student’s rights based on 
three distinct justifications: first, because the language was both plainly 
offensive and potentially disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing 
controversy; second, because the effort to solicit more calls and emails 
made it foreseeable that school operations may be disrupted; and finally, 
because the student’s role as a school government leader risked both 
disruption and frustration of the proper operation of the school’s 
government.237 
The court’s rationale appropriately incorporated the consideration of 
both the effect of the speech and the content of the speech. The second 
and third justifications properly place emphasis on the effect of the 
speech—the foreseeability of the speech having an effect, and her role as 
 229 Id. at 44-45. 
 230 Id. at 45. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
 233 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50. 
 234 Id. at  46 (citing case below, Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn. 
2007)). 
 235 Id. at 51. 
 236 Id. at 53. 
 237 See id. at 50-52. 
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a student increasing the likelihood of such an effect.238  The first 
justification correctly places focus on the “potentially disruptive” content 
of the speech.239  Tinker’s first prong requires that “material or 
substantial disruption to the work and discipline of the school” should 
govern generally school-related online speech.240  Though online student 
speech that generally relates to the school will not come under the 
authority of school officials, the opposite is true for online speech that 
directly triggers Tinker. 
CONCLUSION  
While creating a boundless forum for expressive speech, the 
Internet has caused disorder in the balance between students’ free speech 
rights and school authorities’ interest in maintaining a disciplined school 
environment.  The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court has created 
chaos in the lower courts’ adjudication of online student speech cases. 
Consistent with current Supreme Court precedent, courts ultimately 
look to four factors when analyzing student speech cases: sponsorship, 
location, effect, and content.241 Sponsorship is drawn from the 
Hazelwood standard, which allows school officials to restrict student 
speech that could be seen as school-sponsored.242  This standard is 
directly applicable to online student speech cases. As applied to online 
student speech, the location of the speech is inconsequential given the 
boundless nature of the Internet and its ability to intrude upon the school 
environment.  Ultimately, the effect and the content of online student 
speech are the most applicable factors to assess when determining 
student’s free speech rights. 
The effect and content of online student speech should be analyzed 
to determine student’s free speech rights in the Internet age.  As the 
principal Supreme Court precedent, the two-prong effects test of Tinker 
should be applied to online speech cases because it both designates the 
appropriate standard and allocates the necessary safeguards to students’ 
constitutional rights.  The content of the online student speech should not 
be ignored, but rather examined according to three distinct 
classifications: inherently disruptive speech, focused or targeted speech, 
or general school-related speech. 
 238 Id. at 52. 
 239 Id. at 51-52. 
 240 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
 241 Klupinski, supra note 12, at 643. 
 242 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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Inherently disruptive speech will directly trigger the Tinker 
standard, and should be punishable if the speech creates a material 
disruption within the school.  Online student speech that is focused or 
targeted at the school should be analyzed under both Tinker and Fraser 
standards, because they provide the appropriate balance between 
students’ First Amendment rights and the school’s duty to provide a safe 
learning environment.  Finally, general school-related speech should be 
outside the authority of school officials, unless it creates a substantial or 
material disruption within the school. 
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